Notes: Chapter 4

Cops and Klan, Hand in Hand

Baldwin continues: "They are, moreover...quite stunningly ignorant; and, since they know they are hated, they are always afraid, One cannot possibly arrive at a more sure-fire formula for cruelty." James Baldwin, "A Report from Occupied Territory," in Collected Essays (New York: The Library of America, 1998), 734.

1. "The maintenance of white supremacy, and the old order generally, was a cause in which white men of all classes felt an interest. All classes had been united in a defense of slavery before the war, occasionally joining a patrol or vigilante activity for that purpose, and they had jointly fought a war to preserve the institution." Allen W Trelease, White Error: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 51.
2. The Klan was the most common type of organization, though it lacked any real coherence from place to place and could hardly be considered "one" organization. Still, the differences between the Klans and the other groups were negligible. I follow Trelease here in using the term "Klan" (both to refer to the specific organizations that adopted that name, and as a generic term identifying the type of organization. Trelease, White Terror, xlv-xlvi.
3. Trelease, White Terror, 95.
4. Trelease, White Terror, 17.
5. Trelease, White Terror, 122.
6. Trelease, White Terror, 228.
7. Mary Frances Berry, Black Resistance, White Law: A History of Constitutional Racism in America (New York: The Penguin Press, 1994), 73-74.
8. Dennis C. Rousey, Policing the Southern City: New Orleans, 1805-1889 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 116.
9. Quoted in Melinda Meek Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie: Reconstruction Race Riots in the South" (PhD diss., Kent State University, 1978, University Microfilms International), 45.
10. Rousey, Policing the Southern City, 117-1 18 and 45. Dr. Albert Hartstuff, an Army surgeon, counted thirty-four Black people and four White people killed, along with 153 Black and thirty-one White injured. He considered this a low count, and it surely was, since it was later confirmed that five White people died, including a cop who collapsed from heat exhaustion. Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 47.
11. Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 46.
12. Rousey, Policing the Southern City, 1 19; and Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 49. "The new police force appointed by the former Confederate mayor and commanded by the former Confeder- ate chief was dominated by Confederate veterans." Rousey, Policing the Southern City, 115.
13. Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 49-50.
14. Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 407.
15. Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 417~418. Judge Hansford Dade Duncan Twiggs ofSandersville, Georgia, complained, "The same people who are called upon to administer & vindicate the law, are the same people who violate it." Quoted in Trelease, White Error, 232. Emphasis in original.
16. Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 133, 160, and 265, respectively.
17. Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 123-126.
18. Quoted in Hennessey, "To Live and Die in Dixie," 129.
19. Trelease, White Terror, 228-230.
20. Quoted in Trelease, White Terror, 263.
21. Trelease, White Terror, 204-205.
22. Trelease, White Terror, 156.
23. Near Lumberton, North Carolina, this arrangement was institutionalized. Rather a forming a Klan-type group, Confederate veterans were invited to join "police guard" units. Union army officers armed and deputized them, granting them much of the responsibility for keeping order. Within limits, the military authorities ignored abuses against Black people and Union sympathizers. Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 206-7.
24. Trelease, White Terror, 96.
25. Quoted in Trelease, White Terror, 104.
26. Trelease, White Terror, 400. Even when the army made arrests, few convictions resulted. Only the worst offenders were prosecuted, and many received pardons. In 1876 the entire approach was undermined by the Supreme Court's ruling that the federal government could only protect civil rights against the actions of states, not those of individuals. Trelease, White Terror, 412-18.
27. Alexandria, Louisiana, provides one exception: There the sheriff armed 200 Black people and drove back a Klan attempt to intimidate voters Trelease, White Terror, 95. For a brief while, radical governments incorporated Black people into the state militia and used them to enforce the provisions of martial law, intimidate Democrats on election day, engage in street battles over contested elections, and come to the aid of law enforcement officers facing violent opposition. For example, in Vicksburg, Mississippi, the Black sheriff, Peter Crosby, was illegally deposed by a committee of White citizens. The ensuing battle pitted an all-Black militia company against 100 White men under the leadership of a former Confederate officer. As a result, two White and thirty-six Black 255 people were killed in the battle, federal troops were sent to Vicksburg, and Crosby was returned to lo his position. But as White opposition persisted and the federal government softened its position on Reconstruction, the authorities became less and less willing to mobilize armed Black people, and the militias fell into disuse. Otis A. Singletary, Negro Militia and Reconstruction (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1957). Details of the incident in Vicksburg appear on pages 84-85.
28. Such reservations certainly limited the use of Black militias. Mississippi governor Adelbert Ames, among others, worried that arming Black people could produce "a war of races." Quoted in Singletary, Negro Militia, 146.
29. "A racist of the lowest order, [Sheriff Bryant Peden] publicly held that the blacks were still slaves and offered ten dollars a head for the interest of any ex-slaveholder in his former chattels. He boasted of whipping his own Negroes whenever they required it, just as before the war, and still listed them as property for tax purposes." Trelease, White Terror, 10.
30. New Orleans writer George Washington Cable put it succinctly: "He still served, we still ruled... Emancipation had destroyed private, but had not disturbed public, subjugation." Quoted in Trelease, White Terror, xvi.
31. Rousey, PolicingtheSouthern City, 194: Hadden, Slave Patrols, 196497 and 205; and Trelease, White Terror, 288 and 290.
32. This history - and especially the legacy of slavery - weighs uniquely on the position of Black people in American society. The Black experience has been different than that of Latinos, Asians, Native Americans, Jews, gays, and other excluded groups. The experiences of these other minorities deserve more substantial treatment than they can be given in these pages. But it is specifically the subjugation of Black people that has done so much to shape the institution of policing, at times defining its central function. The treatment of the subject here reflects that predominance.
33. Hadden, Slave Patrols, 219.
34. Hadden, Slave Patrols, 211.
35. Quoted in Hadden, Slave Patrols, 212-213. For a detailed discussion of the connection between slave patrols and the KKK as they appear in Black folklore and oral histories, see: Gladys-Marie Fry, Night Riders in Black Folh History (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975).
36. "Postwar police forces would transform patrolling into a highly effective but still legal means of racial oppression, building upon the practices that many prewar police forces had used when acting as urban patrollers." Hadden, Slave Patrols, 202.
37. Neglect is not so incongruous with brutality and heightened scrutiny as one might assume. During the nineteenth century, "Faced with such abuse from the police, black New Orleanians became reluctant to call on the police when they were victimized by crime." Rousey, Policing the Southern City, 167.
38. Hadden, Slave Patrols, 4.
39. David A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot th (New York: The New Press, 2002), 10-11. Emphasis in original.
40. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 22.
41. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 28.
42. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 48.
43. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 62-63.
44. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 48-49. Ron Hampton, the executive director of the National Black Police Association, complained of a similar trend in police training videos: "In a training video, every criminal portrayed is Black." Quoted in Amnesty International USA, United States of America: Rights for All (New York: Amnesty International, 1998), 27.
45. Quoted in Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 51.
46. William H. Parker, "The Police Role In Community Relations," in Police Patrol Readings, ed. Samuel G. Chapman (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1964), 338v339. Emphasis in original. Parker greatly exaggerated the scientific aspects of policing. In fact, the ability of the police to track crime statistically was - and is - very limited. Even with the assistance of powerful computers, recent efforts to base police deployment on crime statistics have been hopelessly flawed, relying on data drawn from too narrow a sample and subject to manipulation by police managers. See: Sidney L. Harring and Gerda W Ray, "Policing a Class Society: New York City in the 1990s," Social Justice(Summer 1999): 68-69 and 71.
47. Darrell Huff explains the problem this way: "A correlation of course shows a tendency which is not often the ideal relationship described as one to one. Tall boys weigh more than short boys on the average, so this is a positive correlation. But you can easily find a six-footer who weighs less than some five-footers, so the correlation is less than 1.... Even if education generally increases income, it may easily turn out to be the financial ruin of Joe over there. Keep in mind that a correlation may be real and based on real cause and effect - and still be almost worthless in determining action in any single case." Darrell Huff, How to Lie with Statistics (New York: WW Norton, 1954), 92-93.
48. Faced with statistics showing that 85 percent of Volusia County's asset forfeiture cases (during the years 1989-1992) involved Black motorists, Bob Vogel offered this analysis: "What this data tells me is that the majority of money being transported for drug activities involves blacks and Hispanics." Quoted in Christian Parenti, Lochdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (London: Verso, 1999), 54.
49. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 78. Emphasis in original.
50. LAPD officers unwittingly parody Parker's example in this exchange from their Mobile Digital Terminal system, made public by the Christopher Commission: "U can c the color of the interior... dig." "Ya stop cars with blk interior." OJ: "Bees they naugahyde." "Negrohide." "Self tanning no doubt." Quoted in Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department [The Christopher Commission], Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (July 9, 1991), 76.
51. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 59. An earlier study showed that, while Black and White people violated traffic laws at the same rate, and only 13.5 percent of the vehicles traveling on the New Jersey turnpike had a Black occupant, Black drivers represented 35 percent of those stopped and 73.2 precent of those arrested. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 54-55.
52. Quoted in Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 58. Drawing from the same well of excuses, Clayton Searle, the president of the International Narcotics Interdiction Association, states: "the minorities of any major city commit most of the street drug sales and then get arrested disproportionately." Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 73.
53. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 61-62.
54. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 68.
55. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 80-81.
56. Erica Leah Schmitt et al., Characteristics of Drivers Stopped by Police, 1999 (U.S. Department of Justice: March 2002), 1.
57. Black people represent 4.6 percent of the state's driving-age population, but receive 10 percent of all traffic citations; Latinos are 5.6 percent of the driving population but 9.6 percent of those ticketed. Bill Dedman and Francie Latour, "Traffic Citations Reveal Disparity," Boston Globe, January 6, 2003 [database: NewsBank Full-Text Newspapers, accessed January 26, 2003].
58. White people were 33 percent of the drivers stopped and 29.7 percent of the population; Latinos, 38 percent of those stopped and 46.5 percent of the population. Tina Duant and Jill Leovy, "LAPD Offers 1st Data on Traffic Stops," Los Angeles Times, January 7, 2003, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-lapd7jan07.story (accessed January 7, 2003).
59. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 80.
60. Ibid.
61. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 80-81.
62. Dedman and Latour, "Traffic Citations."
63. Michael Cooper, "Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed," New York Times, February 5, 1999; and Robert D. McFadden and Kit R. Roane, "U.S. Examining Killing of Man in Police Custody," New York Times, February 6, 1999.
64. Quoted in McFadden and Roane, "U.S. Examining Killing." It seems the police can mistake practically anything for a gun, when it's in the hands of a young Black man. For instance, in November 1997, a U.S. Marshal shot Andre Burgess, a seventeen-year-old Black man, as he unsuspectingly walked by an unmarked car. The Marshal explained that he mistook Burgess' candy bar for a gun. Amnesty International, United States of America: Rights for All; Race, Rights and Police Brutality (London: Amnesty International, September 1999), 27.
65. Peter Noel, "When Clothes Make the Suspect: Portraits in Racial Profiling," Village Voice, March 15-21, 2000, http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0011/noel.php (accessed April 23, 2002). Though comprising only 1 percent of NYPD officers, the Street Crimes Unit was responsible for 10 percent of all documented stops. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 26. Few months after Diallo's shooting, officers from the Street Crimes Unit shot another unarmed Black man, sixteen-year-old Dante Johnson. Johnson panicked when police stopped him for questioning. He ran, and the cops fired after him. Unlike Diallo, Johnson was fortunate enough to survive. Amnesty International, Rights For All, 9.
66. Quoted in McFadden and Roane, "U.S. Examining Killing."
67. Thomas P. Bonczar and Allen Beck, "Lifetime Likelihood of Going to State or Federal Prison," Bureau ofJustice Statistics Special Report (U.S. Department ofJustice: March 1997), 1.
68. Boncrar and Beck, "Lifetime Likelihood," 7. A different report offers slightly lower figures: "Black non-Hispanics were 5 times more likely than white non-Hispanics, over 2 1/2 times more likely than Hispanics and II times more likely than persons of other races to have been in jail." Allen Beck et al., "Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2001," Bureau of Justice Statistic's Bulletin (U.S. Department of Justice: April 2002), 9.
69. Michael Stephen Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1768-1878 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, I980). 248.
70. Parenti, Lockdown America, 124-123.
71. Quoted in Parenti, Lockdown America, 124.
72. Parenti (1999) 125; and Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units," in Police Perspectives: An Anthology, ed. Larry K. Gaines and Gary W. Cordner (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 1999), 446.
73. Randall C. Sheldon et al., Youth Gangs in American Society (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001 245. At the same time, on the other side of the continent, the Boston Police Department was conducting its "search on sight" campaign against suspected drug dealers, especially young Black men. Part of the effort included taking Black youths off of public buses and forcing their pants down in public view. Charles Ogletree, Jr. et al., Beyond the Rodney King Story: An Investigation of Police Misconduct in Minority Communities (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995). 157.
74. Sheldon et al., Youth Gangs, 244. Parentheses in original.
75. Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Evaluating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 1991). 277-278.
76. Both quoted in Davis, City of Quartz, 278.
77. Christopher Commission, Report, 39.
78. Christopher Commission, Report, 74. Notably, the Christopher Commission both denounced and perpetuated the stereotype of Black criminality. While it disapproved of the style of policing in minority communities, it also cited the "concentration and visibility of gangs and street crime" as deserving a larger share of police attention. in other words, it takes it for granted that minority neighborhoods need higher levels of police attention, just a different kind of attention.
79. Tim Wise. "Racial Profiling and Its Apologists," Z Magazine. March 2002, 44. William Chambliss argues that it is always easier for the police to focus their attention on people who are relatively powerless. Social inequalities thus create a permanent bias in law enforcement activity. "Put quite simply, if the police treat middle and upper-class delinquents (or cocaine-snorting college students) the same way they treat lower-class delinquents (or black, ghetto crack users), they are asking for trouble from people with power. If, on the other hand, they focus their law enforcement efforts on the lower classes, they are praised and supported by 'the community, that is, by the middle and upper-class white community." William J. Chambliss, Power, Politics, and Crime (Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1999), 115. Parentheses in original.
80. "Profiling is, by nature, overinclusive. When being black (or Latino or Asian) is used as a proxy for criminality or dangerousness in a society in which a relative few are criminals, profiles based on or including race will always sweep too widely... The upshot is that even if police investigation using the profile yields some wrongdoers, it is almost certain to capture far more innocent people in its exceedingly wide net - all of whom will be stigmatized, angered, and perhaps traumatized by what happens." Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 106. Parentheses in original.
81. Most famously, police base this perception of deviance on race, but they also use age, economic status, and national origin.
82. David H. Bayley and Harold Mendelsohn, Minorities and the Police: Confrontation in America (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 93.
83. A story from my own experience: I was driving across New Mexico with four friends when we encountered a Border Patrol checkpoint. I produced my license, as requested, and when asked, explained that one of my companions was visiting from England. The border guard - a Latino - asked my English friend if she had her papers. She said she did, but they were in the trunk. Would he like her to get them? "Nah," he said, "we don't mess with people from England." Here's another: I was traveling through Idaho, this time on a Greyhound bus. The bus made a regular stop on its route and was boarded by two Border Patrol agents. They said that they would only keep us a minute, and if everyone would get out their ID it would save a lot of time. They then moved through the bus, from to rear, examining everyone's identification and asking a few people questions about it. When they reached my seat, I did not have out my ID. They asked to see it. I replied with a flat, "No," and they moved on to the next person, just like that. But when they reached the back of the bus, a young Latino man did not respond to their questioning. He was escorted off the bus and placed in a van. I don't know what happened to him. My fellow passengers were, to their credit, quite angry. But it's hard to say whether they were outraged by the obviously racist nature of the arrest, or by the fact that the authorities had stopped them on their travels and - like the secret police in some old movie - demanded "papers, please." I am a White person. That I should have two such anecdotes is a bit harrowing; were I not White, I would likely have many more. (See, for example: Ishmael Reed, "Another Day at the Front: Encounters with the Fuzz on the American Battlefront," in Police Brutality: An Anthology, ed. Jill Nelson [New York: WW Norton, 2000, 189-205.) It is an unhappy, but inescapable, conclusion that in each case, it was only my unearned status as a "White" in a racist society that afforded me protection against the authorities. Neither of these stories involved the police per se, but they both feature profiling. Its implications are the same, whatever agency is involved.
84. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 98-99. He also writes, "Because profiling has such a strong impact on the mobility of those subjected to it - the diminished willingness of minorities to go where they feel they will get undesirable law enforcement attention - these tactics help to reinforce existing segregation in housing and employment." Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 102.
85. Harris, Profiles in Injustice, 105-106.
86. Wise, "Racial Profiling," 44.
87. Sally Simpson describes the historical handling of elite crime: "For the most part, drug addiction (including alcohol) and violence were deemed problems for ethnics (Mexican, Chinese, Italian, Irish, and Black people) and immigrants (predominantly Catholic working class). The 'real' crime problem was thought to rest with the constitutionally inferior and morally lax. Corporate criminals, on the other hand, were drawn from America's newly emerging capitalist Brahmins. Although perceived to be opportunistic and ruthless in their business practices, these entrepreneurs were part of the governing and newly emerging social elite. Consequently, popular definitions ofand legal responses to crime and criminals were framed within divergent ideological and social-control orbits. Conventional crime was dealt with punitively but corporate misbehavior was handled through administrative agencies or relatively lenient criminal statutes." Sally S. Simpson, Corporate Crime, Law, Anti-Social Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2. Parentheses in original.
88. Editorial, "Sensible Sentences," Christian Science Monitor, November 2, 1995, 20. To take just one year's figures: In 1993, 3000 people were convicted of possessing crack. Ninety percent of them were Black. Neil Websdale, Policing the Poor: From Slave Plantation to Public Housing (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 187. See also: Chambliss, Power. Politics, and Crime, 75.
89. Simpson does note that "The social control of corporate offending increasingly is utilizing a strategy of criminalization." Simpson, Corporate Crime, 20. In 2002, the Enron Scandal became a corporate Watergate - a multifaceted cluster of scandals in which questions of individual guilt overshadowed the social and institutional aspects of official malfeasance. But even now, the penalties associated with corporate offenses do not begin to approach the severity of the crimes. "When deaths and injuries due to unsafe products, environmental hazards, and other illegal corporate acts are added to the equation, corporate crime is perhaps the most dangerous and consequential kind ofcrime that occurs in our society." Simpson, Corporate Crime, 14. See also: Chambliss, Power, Politics, and Crime, 133 and 155.
90. Allen Steinberg concludes that in the nineteenth century "the primary lesson of the minor police cases was that the public disorder of the lower classes was subject to the repressive activity of the state.... The exceptional treatment of 'respectable' miscreants proved the rule. Their indiscretions could be overlooked because the larger problem of public disorder was a problem of the lower classes." Allen Steinberg, The Transformation of Criminal justice: Philadelphia 1800-1880 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 128.
91. Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 307.
92. Michael Novick, White Lies, White Power: The Fight Against White Supremacy and Reactionary Violence (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995), 61.
93. Kenneth T. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 190. See also: Seymour Martin Lipset, Why Cops Hate Liberals - And Vice Versa," in The Police Rebellion: A Quest for Blue Power, ed. William Bopp (Springfield, IL: Charles T. Thomas, Publisher, 1971), 26.
94. Quoted in Jackson, Ku Klux Klan in the City, 208.
95. Jackson, Ku Klux Klan in the City, 208-209.
96. Jackson, Ku Klux Klan in the City, 222.
97. Jackson, Ku Klux Klan in the City, 287.
98. Lipset, "Why Cops Hate Liberals," 25; and Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 56.
99. Lipset, "Why Cops Hare Liberals," 25.
100. Herbert Jenkins, Keeping the Peace: A Police Chief Looks at His Job (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 4.
101. Quoted in James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 277.
102. Thurgood Marshall, "The Gestapo in Detroit," The Crisis 50.8 (August 1943): 232-233.
103. Marshall, "Gestapo in Detroit," 233.
104. Marshall, "Gestapo in Detroit," 247.
105. Marshall, "Gestapo in Detroit," 232.
106. Marshall, "Gestapo in Detroit," 247.
107. Marshall, "Gestapo in Detroit," 232.
108. Quoted in National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [The Kerner Commission], Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: EP Dutton Co., Inc., 1968), 85.
109. Quoted in Seth Cagin and Philip Dray, We Are Not Afraid: The Story of Goodman, Schwerner, and Chaney and the Civil Rights Campaign for Mississippi (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1988), 428.
110. Quoted in Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 306.
111. Attorney General Robert Kennedy wrote in a memo to President John F. Kennedy: "The unique difficulty as it seems to me to be presented by the situation in Mississippi (which is duplicated in parts of Alabama and Louisiana at least) is in gathering information on fundamentally lawless activities which have the sanction of local law enforcement agencies, political officials, and a substantial segment of the white population." Quoted in United States. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities [The Church Committee], Final Report ofthe Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, vol. 3 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 240. Ralph McGill, the publisher of the Atlanta Constitution, concurred: "In the small community you too often find that the sheriff is a member [of the Klan] or that the deputies are members. And the poor white man, or more particularly the poor Negro in a small community, he well knows that he has no protection at all. The law isn't going to help him because the law is, more often than not, in the Klan or sympathetic with it in the small Southern community. Quoted in David Lowe, Ku Klux Klan: The Invisible Empire (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), 103.
112. Quoted in Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, 206.
113. Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 307.
114. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid. 111; and Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 306.
115. Connor told reporters: "I have said for the last twenty years that these out-of-town meddlers were going to cause bloodshed...n Quoted in Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Araid, 111.
116. Henry Hampton et al., Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s through the 1980s (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 83.
117. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, 110.
118. Church Committee, Final Report, vol. 3, 739.
119. Quoted Church Committee, Final Report, vol. 2, 13.
120. Quoted in Church Committee, Final Report, vol. 3, 243.
121. Donner, Protectors of Privilege. 308-309.
122. Church Committee, Final Report, vol. 3, 243.
123. Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 309.
124. Both quoted in Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 310.
125. Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 310.
126. Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 311.
127. Berry, Bloch Resistance, 164.
128. Quoted in Hampton et al., Voices of Freedom, 268.
129. Berry, Black Resistance, 164.
130. Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 293.
131. Berry, Black Resistance, 164.
132. Church Committee, Final Report, vol. 3, 241.
133. Historian Howard Zinn notes: "The FBI makes arrests in kidnappings, bank robberies, drug cases, espionage cases. But not in civil rights cases? Then not only were black people second-class citizens, but civil rights law was second-class law." Howard Zinn, "Selma, Alabama," in You Can't Be Neutral on a Moving Train: A Personal History of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 63. Unfortunately, the Justice Department's enforcement priorities have not much changed. "Not only are police misconduct cases prosecuted as the lowest rate among civil rights prosecutions, but civil rights offenses themselves are prosecuted less than any other category of offense handled by the U.S. Justice Department." Human Rights Watch, Shielded From Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), 94.
134. In 1962, the Marshals were used to force the integration of the University of Mississippi. Rodney Stark, Police Riots: Collective Violence and Law Enforcement (Belmont, CA: Focus Books, 1972), 135.
135. Philochs, "Here's to the State of Mississippi," on There But For Fortune (Elektra/Asylum, 1990).
136. Mary Frances Berry notes: "The federal government's response to the Chaney-Goodman-Schwerner murders remained exceptional. Segregationist violence, arson, and murders of civil rights workers for trying to exercise constitutional rights continued unabated.... In fact, the FBI agreed with the Southern devotion to white supremacy. FBI agents spent more time investigating the white students and black activists, who were considered a threat to national security, than worrying about the segregationist violence." Berry Blach Resistance 163.
137. Quoted in Hampton et al., Voices of Freedom, 194.
138. Misseduc Foundation, Inc., Mississippi Blach Paper (New York: Random House, 1965).
139. Quoted in Misseduc Foundation, Inc., "Council of Federated Organizations et al. v LA. Rainey et al.," in Mississippi Black Paper, unpaged. I have restricted the list here to those complaints specifically relating to the actions (or inaction) of law enforcement officials.
140. Quoted in Misseduc Foundation, Inc., Mississippi Black Paper, 6. The names of officers were omitted from the published version, for fear of lawsuits.
141. Quoted in Misseduc Foundation, Inc., Mississippi Black Paper, 25-26.
142. Quoted in Misseduc Foundation, Inc., Mississippi Black Paper, 25.
143. Quoted in Misseduc Foundation, Inc., Mississippi Black Paper, 61.
144. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, en passim.
145. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, 436.
146. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, 288.
147. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, 382.
148. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, 452 and 456.
149. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, 301 and 382.
150. While awaiting trial, Sheriff Rainey appeared on the platform at a Klan rally. He said: "I've been accused by the FBI... [of being sympathetic to] the Klan and everything and so I came down today to see the head man and investigate it and see what there was to it. And I found it so far to be mighty good. They just done a lot of lying about it. I've met some of the best fellows I think there are in Alabama and Mississippi and other places. And I've had to lay some deputies out that's been investigating it and they reported to me a while ago, they'd met some fine people and thought it was a mighty good organization. Thank you." Quoted in Lowe, Invisible Empire, 104-105.
151. Cagin and Dray, We Are Not Afraid, 253-54.
152. Quoted in Hampton et al., Voices of Freedom, 223.
153. Hampton et al., Voices of Freedom, 224-226.
154. Hampton et al., Voices of Freedom, 226-229.
155. Quoted in Darlene Clark Hine et al., The Afliean-American Odyssey (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 535.
156. Zinn, "Selma, Alabama," 65.
157. Stark, Police Riots, 187.
158. "First articulated in 1966 by SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael an [sic] other young militants, Black Power stressed self-determination, the right of ethnic minorities to define their group identity, and to make the decisions that affected their lives." Bob Blauner, "Almost a Race War," in Still the Big News: Racial Oppression in America (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 4. For an excellent overview of the aims and ideology of the Black Power movement, including a discussion of its relationship to the civil rights movement and urban rioting, see: Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, "The Continuing Struggle for Black Power," in Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in American Cities (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), 297-332.

159. The Ten Point Program, quoted in Huey P. Newton, Wiergainst the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America (New York: Harlem River Press, 1996), 119-121.

     1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black community....
     2. We want full employment of our people....
     3. We want an end to the robbery by the capitalists of our black community...
     4. We want decent housing fit for shelter of human beings....
     5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature oft his decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society....
     6. We want all black men exempt from military service....
     7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people....
     8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county, and city prisons and jails....
     9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried i n court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities....
     10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, and peace....

     Each of these general points was expanded on in a brief paragraph. In 1972, the Ten Point Program was revised. Gender-specific language was replaced with gender-neutral phraseology,and the new document made a clear effort to express solidarity with other oppressed groups, and other people of color in particular. Some of the demands were re-ordered. Specifically, a demand for free health care was added, "An immediate end to all wars of agression" replaced the call for exempting Black people from the draft, and points 8 and 9 were consolidated, with the added provision that all wretched, inhuman penal institutions be eliminated. Newton, War Against the Panthers, 123-126; quotes are from page 125.

160. Newton, War Against the Panthers, 34.

161. For more on the Panthers, their survival programs, and the repression they faced, see chapter 7 and the afterword.
162. 162 Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 180.
163. F,K. Heussenstamm, "Bumper Stickers and the Cops," Trans-Action 8.4 (February 1971): 32-33.
164. Stark, Police Riots, 184.
165. Quoted in Stark, Police Riots, 214-215.
166. Novick, White Lies, 70-82. For details on White supremacist organizing among prison guards, see: Parenti, Lochdown America, 206-207.
167. American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Program on Government Surveillance and Citizens' Rights, The Police Threat to Political Liberty: Discoveries and Actions of the American Friends Service Committee Program on Government Surveillance and Citizens' Rights (Philadelphia: AFSC, 1979), 61.
168. Novick, White Lies, 71.
169. Novick, White Lies, 73.
170. Novick, White Lies, 74.
171. Novick, White Lies, 75.
172. Novick, White Lies, 80.
173. Charles E. Simmons, "The Los Angeles Rebellion: Class, Race, and Misinformation," in Why LA Happened: Implications ofthe '92 Los Angeles Rebellion, ed. Haki R. Madhubuti (Chicago: Third World Press, 1993), 144.
174. Human Rights Watch, Shielded From Justice, 191-192.
175. Quoted in Ogletree et al., Beyond the Rodney King Story, 40-41. See also: Mike Davis, "LA: The Fire This Time," CovertAetion Information Bulletin 41 (Summer 1992): 21.
176. Novick, White Lies, 78.
177. Novick, White Lies, 84-85.
178. Novick, White Lies, 80.
179. Christopher Commission, Report, 78. The Commission's report offers some indication of the tension within the LAPD: "The Commission was told by most of the minorities interviewed that racially derogatory remarks are made on an ongoing basis at roll call and that racist jokes and cartoons appeared from time to time on the bulletin boards in the station's locker room. Latino officers reported they are often referred to by ethnic nicknames such as 'Chico,' 'burritoman,' and 'Chuy.'" Christopher Commission, Report, 79. The Commission's survey revealed that a substantial percentage of minority officers had heard racial slurs used by peers or supervisors: 45 percent of Black males, 40 percent of Black females, 27 percent of Latino males, 36 percent of Latina females, 31 percent of Asian males, and 24 percent of Asian females. Christopher Commission, Report, 81.
180. Quoted in Bill Torpy, "FBI Agent: Hate Group May Include Lawmen," Atlanta Journal-Constitution, March 13, 2003 [database: NewsBank Full-Text Newspapers, accessed March 14, 2003].
181. Signe Waller, "Five Alive! The Legacy of the Greensboro Massacre," Z Magazine, September 1999, 45.
182. Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 361.
183. Waller, "Five Alive!" 45-46; and Berry, Blach Resistance, 201.
184. Waller, "Five Alive!" 45.
185. "Informer Testifies Police Knew Klan Intent," New York Times, April 15, 1985.
186. Ibid.
187. Waller, "Five Alive!" 45.
188. Dawson testified that he contacted the police thirteen times in the three weeks prior to the massacre. He called them twice on the morning of November 3, reporting that they were armed and headed to the site. He claims he was shocked when the police didn't stop them. "Informer Testifies Police Knew Klan Intent," New York Times, April 15, 1985, B14.
189. Waller, "Five Alive!" 45.
190. Jack Fowler, Roland Wayne Wood, and Mark Sherer; David Wayne Mathews and Jerry Paul Smith; Edward Dawson; and Jerry H. Cooper and Lieutenant P.W. Spoon, respectively. Cooper was Dawson's police handler. Spoon was in charge of the officers assigned to cover the demonstration. Fowler, Wood, Mathews, and Smith were also held liable for assaulting Paul Bermanzohn and Thomas Clark. "8 in Klan Trial Told to Pay Plaintiffs $390,000," New York Times, June 9, 1985. 2
191. Some researchers have found empirical support for this view of policing. For example, based on a review ofeleven cities) police expenditures during the 1960s, David Jacobs concluded: "Metropolitan areas with more blacks had stronger law enforcement agencies in 1970 but this effect was not present in the 1960 equations. Thus, economic and racial cleavages were better predictors of police strength after a decade of well publicized social upheavals which may have been threatening to elites." David Jacobs, "Inequality and Police Strength: Conflict Theory and Coercive Control in Metropolitan Areas," American Sociological Review 44.6 (1979): 923. In a similar study of public spending in the 1970s, Pamela Irving Jackson found that "the evidence at hand does suggest greater collective commitment to policing in urban centers most likely to be characterized by the struggle for dominance in regions where the minority group is, for historical reasons, likely to be viewed as threatening, and in cities in which the group is large enough to constitute a threat." Pamela Irving Jackson, Minority Group Threat, Crime, and Policing: Social Context and Social Control (New York: Praeger, 1989), 52.