Peter B. Kraska, "Crime Control as Warfare: Language Matters," in Militarizing the American a Criminal justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police, ed. Peter B. Kraska (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 16.
Kraska, "Crime Control as Warfare," 16-17.
Militarism was more closely associated with policing before the development of the modern institution. Sally Hadden describes the connection between the slave patrols and the militia as "intimate." Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 42.
See chapter 6. Examples of the rhetoric abound, especially during the late nineteenth and early twentieth o centuries. To cite one example, in 1895, New York Police Commissioner Avery D. Andrews promised to "instill into our police force that spirit of military discipline and military honor which in our Army, as well as in all others, had been the true secret of success." Avery's success, by all accounts, was quite limited. Quoted in James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 246.
During the sixties, the New York State Conference of Mayors referred to police as "front line troops." The chief of the Cincinnati police said that each officer must become a "foot soldier." Edmund L. McNamara. the commissioner ofthe Boston Police Department, described the patrol force as "infantry." And President Lyndon B. Johnson declared a "war on crime." Quoted in Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 154.
Center For Research on Criminal Justice, The Iron fist and the Velvet Glove: An Analysis of the U.S. Police (Berkeley, CA: Center for Research on Criminal Justice, 1975), 32.
Christian Parenti, "Robocop's Dream: From the Military to Your Street, Omnipresent Surveillance," The Nation, February 3, 1997, 22-23.
Quoted in Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 36.
Daryl F. Gates with Diane K Shah, Chief My Life in the LAPD (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 113-114.
Police paramilitary units (PPUs) operate under a variety of monikers, including special response teams, emergency response teams, and tactical operations teams. Christian Parenti, Lackdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (London: Verso, 1999), 112. Both PPU and SWAT are sometimes used as generic terms.
Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 48; and Gates, Chief 115.
Gates, Chief, 119-123.
Gates, Chief, 135, 137; and Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 50-51.
Gates, Chief, 137.
Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron Fist, 31, and Gates, Chief: 157.
Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron Fist, 49.
Peter B. Kraska, "The Military-Criminal Justice Blur: An Introduction," in Kraska, Militarizing the American Criminal justice System, 7.
Diane Cecelia Weber, "Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police Departments," Cato Institute Briefing Papers 30 (August 26, 1999): 7.
A 1994 memorandum of understanding between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense allows for the transfer of military equipment to state and local police. In the three years following the agreement, the Department of Defense gave police 1.2 million pieces of military hardware, including 112 armored personnel carriers and seventy-three grenade launchers. The LAPD alone received 6,000 M-16s. Weber, "Warrior Cops," 5 and 2.
About half (46 percent) of police paramilitary units receive training directly from the military. One SWAT officer brags, "We've had special forces folks who have come right out of the jungles of Central and South America. These guys get into the real shit. All branches of military service are involved in providing training to law enforcement.... We've had teams of Navy Seals and Army Rangers come here and teach us everything." Quoted in Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units," in The Police and Society, ed. Victor E. Kappeler (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1999), 471.
Parenti, Lockdown America, 111-115.
Quoted in Parenti, Lockdown America, 111. A 10 PM. curfew provides a useful tool for getting young people into the computer system. Enforcement is strict, but selective. Latino youth are five times more likely than White youth to be arrested for curfew violations; and Black people are three times more likely than White people. Parenti, Lochdown America, 123.
Parenti, Lockdown America, 118.
Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 469.
Quoted in Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 469. The legacy of the slave patrols is often eerily evident in these operations. One PPU commander mused: "When the soldiers ride in you should see those blacks scatter." Quoted in Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 475. Compare with this description, dating from the 1850s: "It was a stirring scene, when the drums beat at the Guard house in the public square to witness the negroes scour in the streets in all directions...." Quoted in Dennis C. Rousey, Policing the Southern City: New Orleans, 1805-1889 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 21.
Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police."
Charles Dunlap. Jr., "The Thick Green Line: The Growing Involvement of Military Forces in Domestic Law Enforcement," in Kraska, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System, 39.
Parenti, Lochdown America, 131.
Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley, The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American Cities (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 132.
Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 468.
Quoted in Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 468.
Gates, Chief 277-280.
Quoted in Matt Ehling, Urban Warrior [video] (ETS Pictures, 2002).
Parenti, Lochdown America, 130. Similar cases involving injury to suspects, bystanders, or cops are appallingly common. See: Parenti, Lochdown America, 127-131; and Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 468.
The SWAT teams are deployed "not. . . [in response to] an existing high-risk situation but [in anticipation of] one generated by the police themselves...." Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 468.
Peter B, Kraska, "Epilogue: Lessons Learned," in Kraska, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System, 159.
Quoted in Gates, Chief 286-287. Gates later described it as his intention to "Us[e] hyperbole to draw attention to a big problem." Gates, Chief 297. I quote his statement here in the same spirit. The fact that Gates's quip follows from the logic of a drug "war" represents reductio ad absurdum at its best.
See chapter 3.
See, for instance: Human Rights Watch, Shielded From justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), 314.
Parenti, Lockdown America, 50-51, 53.
Parenti, Lockdown America, 54.
Parenti, Lockdown America, 52.
The militarization of law enforcement has two dimensions - the degree to which the police come to resemble the military, and the degree to which the military becomes entrenched in domestic policing. Congress has authorized the military to provide equipment, research facilities, training, and advice to aid local law enforcement in anti-drug efforts, to participate directly in efforts to keep drugs from crossing the border, and - in the case of the National Guard - to join local police in drug raids and patrols. Dunlap, "Thick Green Line," 29; Weber, "Warrior Cops," 2; and Parenti, Lockdown America, 47-48. Perhaps oddly, some of the strongest voices against military involvement in domestic policing come from within the armed forces. In practical terms, military commanders worry that police operations reduce combat effectiveness, are bad for morale and discipline, and damage the citizenry's trust in the military. More idealistic officers express concerns about the separation of powers, the centralization of police command, mission creep, and civil liberties. See, for example: Dunlap, "Thick Green Line."
It is sometimes wrongly thought that the police excursion into social work represents an entirely new phenomenon. But before the rise of the modern welfare system, the police were often the only government agency available to care for the poor. They provided overnight lodging for the homeless (in an area apart from the jails); distributed free firewood, shoes, and other necessities; and sometimes ran soup kitchens and employment services. These welfare functions were eliminated during the Progressive Era, in part so that the police could focus on crime, and in part because reformers felt the poor would be better served in the workhouse. See: Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), xiii, 86-127, 147; Raymond B. Fosdick, American Police Systems (New York: The Century Company, 1920), 366, 370-376; Fogelson, Big-City Police, 60, 87, and 187; W Marvin Dulaney, Black Police in America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 107-108; Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 76, 114, 191-194, and 206; Rousey, Policing the Southern City, 132-133; Sidney L. Harring, Policing a Class Society: The Experiment of American Cities, 1865-1915 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983) 220; and Richardson, New York Police, 264-265.
Klockars suggests that "community policing" is only a rhetorical device, used to obscure and legitimate the central place of violence in police operations. Carl B. Klockars, "The Rhetoric of Community Policing." in Victor E. Kappeler. The Police and Society (Prospect Heights, 11; Waveland (TI Press. 1999).
Skolnick and Bayley. New Blue Line. 21.
For case studies of early community policing programs. see: Skolnick and Bayley. New Blue Line. For discussion on how specific programs fit into the community policing strategy. see: Herman Goldstein. "Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential. Basic Requirements. and "Threshold Questions," Crime and Delinquency (January 1987); and Gary W. Cordner, "Elements of Community Policing," in Policing Perspectives: An Anthology. ed. Larry K. Gaines and Gary W Cordner (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 1999). For a discussion of early experiments with the various programs. see: Center for Research on Criminal Justice. Iron Fist.
Cordner. "Elements of Community Policing," 138-144.
Community Policing Consortium. "Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action" [NCJ 148457] (Washington. D.C.: United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Assistance. August 1994), 3.
Skolnick and Bayley. New Blue Line. 213.
In 1993, 50 percent of police administrators said they had a community policing program, and another 20 percent said they intended to establish one within a year. Neil Websdale, Policing the Poor: From Slave Plantation to Public Housing (Boston: Northeastern University Press. 2001). 194.
Gates, Chief. 307-309.
Gates. Chief 308 and 267.
Matthew T. DeMichele and Peter B. Kraska. "Community Policing in Battle Garb: A Paradox or Coherent Strategy?" in Kraska. Militarizing the American Criminal justice System, 87.
DeMichele and Kraska. "Community Policing in Battle Garb." 87-88.
Problem-oriented policing goes a step further than what is commonly conveyed in community policing by asserting up front that the police job is not simply law enforcement. but dealing with a wide range of community problems - only some of which constitute violations of the law. It further asserts that enforcement of the law is not an end in itself. but only one of several means by which the police can deal with the problems they are expected to handle." Goldstein, "Toward Community-Oriented Policing." 16.
See chapter 6.
See chapters 2 and 3.
Even the Community Policing Consortium report acknowledges this fact, though of course it tries to put the best face on it: "Police became the targets of hostility, which ultimately led police leaders to concerned reflection and analysis." Community Policing Consortium, "Understanding Community Policing," 7.
See chapters 7 and 8.
A 1968 Pentagon report to President Johnson warned against increasing the number of troops in Vietnam, citing the war's unpopularity: "This growing disaffection accompanied as it certainly will be, by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems, runs great risk of provoking a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions." Quoted in Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States, 1492-Present (New York: Harper Perrenial, 1995), 491.
"The fact that police actions triggered many of the riots and then could not control them revealed to everyone the price of having a police department backed only by the power of the law, but not by the consent, much less active support, of those being policed." Hubert Williams and Patrick V. Murphy, "The Evolving Strategy of Police: A Minority View," in Kappeler, Police and Society, 30.
These advantages are specifically noted by the Community Policing Consortium, though in somewhat coded language: "Cooperative problem solving reinforces trust, facilitates the exchange of information, and leads to the identification of other areas that could benefit from the mutual attention of the police and the community." Community Policing Consortium, "Understanding Community Policing," 18.
Victor E. Kappeler and Peter B. Kraska, "A Textual Critique of Community Policing: Police Adaption to High Modernity," Policing: An International journal of Police Strategies and Management 21:2 (1998), 305; and Victor E. Kappeler, "Reinventing the Police and Society: The Spectacle of Social Control," in Kappeler, Police and Society, 488.
Kappeler and Kraska, "Textual Critique," 305.
Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 70. Emphasis in original. In the early 1970s, the LAPD began organizing neighborhood meetings as part of its team-policing program (called the "Basic Car Plan"). The police used these meetings to recruit informants and to circulate petitions calling for the reintroduction of the death penalty. Huey P. Newton, "A Citizen's Peace Force," Crime and Social justice: A journal of Radical Criminology (Spring-Summer 1974), 39.
Cordner, "Elements of Community Policing," 143. See also: Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 58. One would think that community policing advocates would be careful about using the words "collaborate," "collaboration," and "collaborators," given their Nazi-era connotations. Oddly, the critical analyses of community policing rhetoric (e.g., Klockars, "Rhetoric of Community Policing" and Kappeler and Kraska, "Textual Critique") seem to have missed this point.
Goldstein, "Toward Community-Oriented Policing," 7. Goldstein does recognize some of the inherent dangers of assigning the police such a role. "As an illustration, community organizing is almost always listed as one of the tools available to community police officers... If a problem, such as residential burglaries, is identified, it is admirable when a police officer can mobilize a neighborhood in ways that deal effectively with the problem. But what if the same organization-structure is subsequently used to lobby against a half-way house for the mentally ill, or is used to prevent a minority businessman from moving into the neighborhood, or is used to endorse candidates for public office?" Goldstein, "Toward Community-Oriented Policing," 22.
Goldstein's concerns are more than hypothetical. In 1986, the police union used Los Angeles' neighborhood watch program to push for a recall election to remove liberal judges on the California Supreme Court. Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 390.
Michael E. Buerger and Lorraine Green Mazerolle, "Third-Party Policing: Theoretical Aspects of an Emerging Trend," Kappeler, Police and Society, 420.
In Los Angeles, prosecutors have used civil abatement laws to require landlords to remove graffiti every day and to erect fencingaround their property, install lighting, tow abandoned cats, trim shrubbery, and evict tenants suspected of drug dealing. At the same time, police increase their patrols in the area.
L.A. City Attorney Gang Prosecution Section, "Civil Gang Abatement: A Community Based Tool of the Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney," in The Modern Gang Reader, ed. Jody Miller et al. (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 2001), 325.
The dangers of allowing the state to co-opt community institutions, especially those of oppressed minorities, should be clear enough. But in case they're not, history has provided a particularly chilling example:
Whenever the extermination process was put into effect, the Germans utilized the existing leadership and organizations of the Jewish community to assist them.... In the face of the German determination to murder all Jews, most Jews instinctively relied on their own communal organizations to defend their interests wherever possible. Unfortunately, these very organizations were transformed into subsidiaries of the German police and state bureaucracies....
Thus, the official agency of German Jews undertook such tasks as selecting those who were to be deported, notifying the families and, finally, of sending the Jewish police to round up the victims." Richard L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1978), 72 and 74. Emphasis in original. See also: Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1964), 117-125.
Community Policing Consortium, "Understanding Community Policing," 13. Elsewhere, the report reads, "A concrete indication of community policing's success is the commitment of an increased level of community resources devoted to crime reduction efforts." Community Policing Consortium, "Understanding Community Policing," 47.
Quoted in Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 64.
The Community Policing Consortium endorses this interpretation: "Community policing is democracy in action. It requires the active participation of local government, civic and business leaders, public and private agencies, residents, churches, schools, and hospitals. All who share a concern for the welfare of the neighborhood should bear responsibility for safeguarding that welfare." Community Policing Consortium, "Understanding Community Policing," 4.
Goldstein, for example, acknowledges that community policing opens questions about the limits of the police function, officer discretion, accountability, the means available for problem solving, and the role of the community. But, he notes: "Questions about the degree of community involvement in determining the policies of police agencies are not as open-ended as previous questions raised. Experience has taught us that, in carrying out some aspects of their functions, the police must be insulated from community influences. Some of their decision-making authority cannot be shared.... The standards ofa neighborhood cannot be substituted for the rules of the state." Goldstein, "Toward Community-Oriented Policing," 25.
The Iron fist and the Velvet Glove compares "citizen participation" in policing to "worker participation" in management. Neither involve a real transfer of power. Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 59. A discussion of corporatism appears in chapter 6.
Quoted in Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 30.
Martin Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1993), 68. Smith also writes: "Policy is developed through negotiations and any groups involved in the process can assist in implementation. The state agency is able to achieve its goals through the incorporation of the pressure group. Policy networks are a means of extending the infrastructural power of society by establishin gmechanisms for negotiation which allow greater intervention in civil society." Smith. Pressure, Power and Policy, 53-54.
In their discussion of Detroit's community policing experiments, Skolnick and Bayley write, "Because the mini-stations organize people, they develop considerable political clout.... Not only do they help give voice to the security concerns of local residents. but they assist in representing communities before various public and private authorities, such as zoning boards, developers, and the sanitation and public works departments. As a result, mini-station officers develop the kind of grassroots connections politicians labor over." Skolnick and Bayley. New Blue Line, 71-72.
As we saw in chapter 6, this kind of relationship has allowed for a level of cohesion and cooperation between local governments, police departments, and police unions, even as they wage a three-way struggle for control.
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department [The Christopher Commission]. Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (July 9. 1991), 102-103.
Christopher Commission, Report. 103. Comparisons to military occupation are not wholly rhetorical. I witnessed an operation similar to Cul-de-Sac in the Logan Circle neighborhood of Washington, D.C., during the winter of 1998. National Guard troops blocked off my street with humvees. They stood in clusters at each end of the block, wearing helmets and bulletproof vests, and turning away traffic. At night they used generators to power enormous flood lights, under which the street appeared brighter than it did during the day.
A friend who lived a few blocks over reported a similar occurrence on his street some weeks earlier. He asked one of the soldiers what they were doing. The soldier replied, "Preventing crime."
And it was true. Rhode Island Avenue. between Logan Circle and 13th Street was, and probably is, a popular spot for illicit exchanges of various kinds. During the occupation (as I thought of it), all apparent drug activity ceased. But so did practically everything else. On a typical day, even in the winter, the street would be the site of children playing, couples out for evening strolls. people walking their dogs, sitting on their front stoop, washing cars in the parking lot on the corner, and otherwise just hanging out. The National Guard put an end to all that. For a few days, the noise of cars, music, and simple human conversation was replaced with the sterile hum of an electric generator. But after a few nights, the soldiers left - moving on, surely, to someone else's neighborhood - and life returned to normal, or what passes for normal in the colony that serves as the seat of our government.
Goldstein writes: "Officers are frequently expected not only to respond to the full range of problems that the public expects the police to handle - but also to take the initiative to identify whatever community problems - beyond those within the widest definition of the police functioning - that may affect the public's sense of well-being." Goldstein, "Toward Community-Oriented Policing," 9.
A more direct statement might read: Community policing encourages the police to overreach their authority, to look for opportunities to insert themselves into community life, and to expand the police function.
DeMichele and Kraska, "Commmunity Policing in Battle Garb," 86-87. Parentheses in original.
Parenti, Lochdown America, 102.
"Places abandoned by the government and the police for decades-inner cities, railroad yards, and river-front properties - are being reclaimed because they are now seen as valuable locations for capital investment." Kappeler, Police in Society, 484.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 40.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 39.
William Wilberforce, an eighteenth-century reformer and friend to Jeremy Bentham, wrote in 1787: "[T]he most effectual way of preventing the greater crimes is punishing the smaller, and endeavoring to repress that general spirit of licentiousness which is the parent of every species of vice." Quoted in Reynolds, Before the Bobbies, 71.
James Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows," Atlantic Monthly, March 1982, 29-38.
Wilson and Kelling, "Broken Windows," 31-32.
The Community Policing Consortium provides some specifics: "Ridding the streets of gangs, drunks, panhandlers, and prostitutes - perhaps with the help of public and private social agencies - will enhance the quality of life. Removing signs of neglect (e.g., abandoned cars, derelict buildings, and garbage and debris) will offer tangible evidence that community policing efforts are working to bring about increased order in the community." Community Policing Consortium, "Understanding Community Policing," 47. Parentheses in original.
And sometimes explicit: "A busy, bustling shopping center and a quiet, well-tended suburb may need almost no visible police presence. In both cases, the ratio of respectable to disreputable people is ordinarily so high as to make informal social control effective. Wilson and Kelling, "Broken Windows," 36.
Broken Windows theorists point to New York's statistical drop in crime during the 1990s as the empirical evidence. See, for example: William Bratton (with Peter Knobler), Turnaround: How Americas Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic (New York: Random House, 1998), 259, 289-290, and 294-295.
There are several related problems with this argument. first, it should be remembered that crime is a complex phenomenon; its prevalence or decline is likely the result of multiple (and often, poorly understood) factors. (For a brief overview, see: James Lardner, "Can You Believe the New York Miracle?" New York Review of Books [August 14, 1997].) Second, crime is notoriously difficult to measure. Third, available statistics are subject to misinterpretation and manipulation. Fourth, a managerial system that rewards "good stats" (and punishes "bad") builds in an incentive for intentionally distorting the figures. (Officials in both "the NYPD and the New York Transit Police were forced to retire after they were caught skewing their numbers to fabricate drops in the crime rate.) And finally, the most reliable statistics available - those based on crime victim surveys - showed no change in the crime rate during Giuliani's reign. See: Parenti, Lochdown America, 83; Sidney L. Harring and Gerda W Ray, "Policing a Class Society: New York City in the 1990s," Social Justice (Summer 1999), 69-71; and William]. Chambliss, Power, Politics, and Crime (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 43.
There is, in fact, empirical evidence to support the idea that improved welfare services help reduce crime. See: Elliott Currie, Crime and Punishment in America (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998).
Klockars, "Rhetoric of Community Policing," 428.
This gets to the core of what is wrong with Wilson and Kelling's View, ethically speaking. They don't take rights or justice seriously. For instance: "Arresting a single drunk or single vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seems unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants may destroy an entire neighborhood." Wilson and Kelling, "Broken Windows," 35.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 160-163; 167-170.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 175, 178. Noting the NAACP's complaints, Skolnick and Bayley recommend that the police there engage in Santa Ana-style community organizing to reduce the friction.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line. 135-137.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 138-139.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 40.
See chapters 3 and 5.
Wilson and Kelling, "Broken Windows," 33.
Samuel Walker, "'Broken Windows' and Fractured History," Policing Perspectives: An Anthology, ed. Larry K. Gaines and Gary W Cordner (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 1999), Walker goes on to explain, quite rightly, that Wilson and Kelling exaggerate the depersonalization of policing in the twentieth century, over-state the cops' focus on crime control, ignore the controversy that has always surrounded the police, and idealize the nineteenth-century patrolman. Walker, "'Broken Windows' and Fractured History," 117.
"The soldier boy for his soldier's pay obeys/the sergeant at arms, whatever he says./The sergeant will for his sergeant's pay obey/the captain till his dying day/The captain will for his captain's pay obey/the general order of battle play/The generals bow to the government, obey/the charge, You must not relent." The Clash, "Inoculated City," Combat Rock (New York: Epic, 1982).
Parenti, Lochdown America, 107.
Bratton asks rhetorically, "Why 'Glazier?' How do you fix a broken window?" Bratton, Turnaround, 159.
Bratton, Turnaround, 159, 161.
Parenti, Lochdown America, 74.
Bratton, Turnaround, 173-174.
Quoted in Bratton, Turnaround, 177.
Bratton, Turnaround, 228.
Bratton called the squeegee workers "a living symbol of what was wrong with the city." Bratton, Turnaround, 212.
Bratton, Turnaround, 213-214.
Parenti, Lockdown America, 77. Bratton's overhaul of the Transit Police had prepared him well for such one-sided class warfare. Because of his work with the transit cops, hundreds of homeless people - people who out of desperation sought refuge in the dark, wet, rat-infested subway tunnels - were driven out, onto the street, into the cold. Parenti, Lockdown America, 74.
Bratton reasoned that "if you stop kids who aren't in school, you're probably stopping kids who are no good..." Quoted in Parenti, Lochdown America, 77. He must have decided that the kids in school weren't much good either, since he also tripled the number of cops patrolling the public schools. Parenti, Lockdown Amerioa, 78.
Parenti, Loe/edown Amerioa, 77-79 and 103-108.
Human Rights Watch, Shielded from Justioe, 39.
Parenti, Lockdown Amerioa, 79.
Quoted in Human Rights Watch, Shieldedflomjustioe. 373-374.
Parenti, Lockdown America, 85.
One witness described the situation: "[H]e was just sitting there.... the officers were in his face, speaking badly to him. I came back a minute later, and there were so many police cars, I thought it was a bank robbery...." Quoted in Amnesty International, "United States of America; Rights for All; Race, Rights and Police Brutality" (London: Amnesty International, September 1999), 17.
"200 Protest Sit-Lie Rule," Portland Tribune, September 20, 2002; and Chris Lydgate and Cheryl Revell, "St. Francis Showdown," Willamette Week, November 6, 2002, 11.
126 Megan Garvey, "Bratton Is Planning a Clean Start: The Police Chief, Who Will be Sworn in Today, Sees fighting Graffiti as Key to Reducing Crime," Los Angeles limes, October 25, 2002. Bratton explained police plans to round up homeless people with a comparison to his earlier anti-squeegee campaign: "The squeegee pests were symbols of fear and lack of police control and disorder.... The equivalent in downtown [L.A.] is begging. Some of it's benign. But it raises the degree ofdiscomfort for the average person." Quoted in Richard Winston and Kristina Saverwein, "LAPD Tests New Police Strategy," Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2003.
Meanwhile, Bratton also called for an "all-out assault" against gangs, describing gang activity as "homeland terrorism." Quoted in Celeste Fremon, "View from Parker Center: A One-on-One with Police Chief Bill Bratton," LA Weekly, January 10, 2003-January 16, 2003, http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/08/news-fremon.php (accessed January 15, 2003).
Quoted in Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 472.
See, for example: DeMichele and Kraska, "Commmunity Policing in Battle Garb," 89; Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 469-70, 472-73; and Parenti, Lockdown America, 87.
For example, Lieutenant Greg Cooper, the area commander of Area A in Santa Ana, was responsible for overseeing the greatest successes of the community policing program there while also serving as the head of the SWAT team. Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 30. Attorney Paul Richmond notes a transfer of personnel from community policing assignments to paramilitary units, usually accompanied by promotions. Paul Richmond, untitled lecture (Portland, Oregon: Liberty Hall, August 26, 2002).
Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 470; and Parenti, Lockdown America, 85.
Quoted in Spencer S. Hsu, "D.C. Forms Network of Surveillance: Police System of Hundreds of Video Links Raises Issues of Rights, Privacy," W/ashington Post, February 17, 2002.
The use of cameras to monitor protests worries City Council member Jim Graham: "These cameras have been set up to deal with demonstrations and dissent. This will have a chilling effect and discourage citizens from demonstrating openly here in the capital of the United States of America." Quoted in David A. Fahrenthold and David Nakamura, "Council Attacks DC Surveillance Cameras," W/ashington Post, November 8, 2002 [database: NewsBank Full-Text Newspapers (accessed May 20, 2003)].
Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 472.
For instance, Sergeant John Dough of the Newark Police Department described the organizational demands presented by street sweeps: "One of the underlying features of this whole activity is operating as a unit, rather than as individual action. As a unit, you have to have a game plan and report your method ofoperations beforehand." Quoted in Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 198.
MarkJ. Osiel, Obey/ing Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publications, 2002), 212, 220.
Osiel, Oheying Orders, 243-244. Parentheses in original.
Colonel Kenneth Estes writes in The Marine Officers Guide: "The best discipline is self-discipline. To be really well-disciplined, a unit must be made up of individuals who are self-disciplined." Quoted in Osiel, Oheying Orders, 211. In the community policing context, "Each officer had to be imbued with the department's values so that they could translate them into the reality of life in the unpredictable situations that would be encountered. Management's job was not to make choices for officers; it was to instruct officers about what was expected ofthem in all situations." Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 85.
"Circus dogs jump when the trainer cracks his whip, but the really well-trained dog is the one that turns his somersault when there is no whip." George Orwell, "As I Please" [Tribune (January 7, 1944)], The Collected Essays, journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Volume [I]: As 1 Please, 1943-1945, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (New York: Harcourt, Brace 8i World, Inc., 1968), 181.
Bratton, Turnaround, 233-234.
Quoted in Bratton, Turnaround, 238.
Bratton, Turnaround, 239. Parenti reads one further step into the process: "[C]aptains lean on lieutenants, who lean on sergeants, who lean on beat cops, who, it could be said, lean on civilians." Parenti, Lochdown America, 76.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 217-220; and Cordner, "Elements of Community Policing," 144.
Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 218.
Ibid.
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [The Kerner Commission], Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1968), 328.
The well-titled book The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove was among the first to observe this relationship. "In addition to the rise of new, sophisticated technologies, another striking development in the U.S. police apparatus during the sixties was the growth of new strategies of community penetration and 'citizen participation' that sought to integrate people in the process of policing and to secure the legitimacy of the police system itself... On the other side of the coin, the police have developed a variety of new 'tough' specialized units-special anti-riot and tactical patrol forces, 'special weapons' teams, and highly sophisticated intelligence units." Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 7. Also: Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Iron fist, 30.
See, for example: Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971), 67. Kitson's work is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 129. For a description of a similar structure applied to Santa Ana's block captain program, see: Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 28.
Quoted in Jennifer Anderson, "Cops Jab at Drugs, One Bust at a Time," Portland Tribune, December 17, 2002, A3. The raid documented by the Tribune produced three arrests, all for misdemeanors. By the cops' own admission, such raids rarely result in jail time. Rather, the most common consequence is eviction, leading to homelessness. Anderson, "Cops Jab at Drugs."
"Apparently, some police agencies are integrating a military-model approach-occupy, suppress through force, and restore the affected territory with community policing ideology, which emphasizes taking back the neighborhood, creating a climate of order, and enacting preventive and partnership strategies. Again, New York City's style of zero-tolerance community policing is the best-known example." DeMichele and Kraska, "Community Policing in Battle Garb," 96. See also: DeMichele and Kraska, "Community Policing in Battle Garb," 87-88.
This strategy can sometimes be used to divide communities that have traditionally been a source of resistance against the police. For instance, "measures that target young people are frequently cloaked in the notion that 'good citizens' must 'take back' and 'reclaim' their communities from the lawless elements that have been permitted to run amok. Increasing schisms of generation and class within communities of color demarcate the boundaries between the 'good guys, and the 'bad guys." Daniel HoSang, "The Economics of the New Brutality," ColorLines (Winter 1999-2000), 25.
Quoted in Martin Sénchez Jankowski, Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 256.
Kitson advises: "In practical terms the most promising line of approach lies in separating the mass of those engaged in the campaign from the leadership by the judicious promise of concessions, at the same time imposing a period of calm by the use of government forces... Having once succeeded in providing a breathingspace by these means, it is most important to do three further things quickly. The first is to implement the promised concessions so as to avoid allegations of bad faith which may enable the subversive leadership to regain control over certain sections of the people The second is to discover and neutralize the genuine subversive element. The third is to associate as many prominent members of the population, especially those who have been engaged in non-violent action, with the government. This last technique is known in America as co-optation...." Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 87.
"Because insurgency is bred in a climate of social malaise, US-backed counterinsurgency campaigns must seek to neutralize public disaffection areas through social, political, and economic initiatives aimed at (winning hearts and minds' for the prevailing regime." Michael T. Klare, "The Interventionist Impulse: U.S. Military Doctrine for Low-Intensity Warfare," Low-Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgenqy, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 75.
Quoted in Bratton, Turnaround, 274. Political rivalry between Bratton and Giuliani prevented Operation Juggernaut's implementation, though a much more modest, localized version was tried in North Brooklyn. Bratton, Turnaround, 278 and 296.
Quoted in Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 473.
Thomas A. Marks, "Northern Ireland and Urban America on the Eve of the 21st Century," Global Dimensions of High Intensity Crime and Low Intensity Conflict. ed. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1995), 76.
Allan Silver, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Police, and Riot," The Police: Six Sociological Essays, ed, David Bordua (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), 8.